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Wages, Employment and Tenure of Temporarily Subsidized Workers: 
Does the Industry Matter?
* 
 
This paper explores whether wage, employment and tenure outcomes of workers taking up a 
job subsidized by the German Federal Employment Agency differ by industry. The analysis 
utilizes administrative data and statistical matching techniques; it covers an observation 
period of 3.5 years. First, we conduct a within-industry comparison of temporarily subsidized 
and otherwise similar unsubsidized workers. The findings show for most industries that 
subsidized workers had similar short-run wages, but fared significantly better in the longer 
run. Second, we compare labor market outcomes of subsidized workers within each industry 
with those of similar subsidized workers in other industries. The main result is that cumulated 
wages of workers would not have differed significantly, if they had been hired in another 
industry instead. However, we find significant differences in short-term wages, employment 
and tenure outcomes across industries. Finally, from a fiscal point of view it seems more 
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1  Introduction 
Wage subsidies reduce labor costs and thus provide an incentive for employers to hire 
workers whose factual or perceived productivity does not cover their labor costs (Bell et 
al. 1999). In Germany, caseworkers in local labor market offices may grant such wage 
subsidies to employers, if these hire workers with temporarily productivity deficits at a 
particular job. If firms dismiss workers during the subsidization period or a follow-up 
period of the same length, they can be obliged to reimburse part of the subsidy. Thus, 
workers have the opportunity during this “protection period” to increase productivity 
through learning-on-the-job and to reduce an employer’s uncertainty about their skills. 
Such  wage  subsidies  are  an  important  part  of  German  active  labor  market  policies: 
From 2003 to 2005, the number of entries into the program decreased from 180,000 to 
134,000, but afterwards it increased again to around 250,000 yearly entries during 2007 
to 2009. 
Notwithstanding the high number of entries into such programs, the recent literature on 
wage subsidies does not provide much information whether effects on the employment 
prospects of subsidized workers vary by industry. This study aims to fill this gap in the 
literature. For job entries during the second quarter of 2003, it explores whether wage, 
employment and tenure outcomes of subsidized and unsubsidized workers differ across 
ten German industries, in which 70 percent of all subsidized workers were hired. In a 
first step, we compare labor market outcomes of individuals taking up a subsidized job 
with those of similar unsubsidized hires within the same industry. In a second step, we 
ask whether a worker taking up a subsidized job in a particular sector would have bene-
fited from finding a subsidized job in another sector. The analysis is based on adminis-
trative data; comparisons groups are selected by means of statistical matching.  
Several studies have already investigated the effect of wage subsidies on the employ-
ment and tenure outcomes of subsidized workers in the US, Sweden, Belgium, the UK 
and Germany (e.g. Burtless 1985, Card/Hyslop 2009, Carling/Richardson 2004, Cockx 
et  al.  1998,  Dorsett  2006,  Fredriksson/Johansson  2008,  Forslund  et  al.  2004,  Göbel 
2006, 2007, Jaenichen 2002, Jaenichen/Stephan 2009, Ruppe 2009, Sianesi 2008), or on 
the wages of initially subsidized workers (Dubin/Rivers 1993, Brouillette/Lacroix 2008, 
Hamersma 2008). This paper extends and builds on a previous study for Germany (Ste- 
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phan 2010), which did, however, not differentiate between industries. For the short-run, 
it showed that wages of previously unemployed workers taking up a subsidized job did 
not differ from those of otherwise similar individuals who found an unsubsidized job. 
Thus,  in  contrast  to  previous  studies  for  the  US,  neither  evidence  on  rent  sharing 
through subsidies (Hamersma 2008) nor stigma effects of subsidies (Dubin/Rivers 1993, 
Brouillette/Lacroix 2008) were found. But cumulated wages of subsidized workers were 
higher over a longer time-horizon, because their employment shares exceeded those of 
unsubsidized workers.  
With few exceptions, however, firm heterogeneity in selection into schemes as well as 
in determining these outcomes has been neglected in the literature. For the US Work 
Opportunity  Tax  Credit  and  the  Welfare-to-Work  Tax  Credit  programs,  Hamersma 
(2010) analyzed why only a fraction of employers of eligible workers claimed subsidies 
and found that firms with a larger fraction of workers exceeding the program’s job dura-
tion thresholds are more likely to claim the subsidy. For the same programs, Hamers-
ma/Heinrich  (2008)  paid  particular  attention  to  subsidies  granted  to  temporary  help 
firms. They showed that subsidized workers in the analyzed US temporary help firms 
had higher earnings than unsubsidized ones; nonetheless, their earnings and tenure were 
lower than those of subsidized workers in other industries. 
The  broad  international  literature  on  inter-industry  wage  differentials  (starting  with 
Dickens/Katz 1987, Krueger/Summers 1987, 1988) has shown that large and persistent 
inter-industry wage differences prevail even after controlling for a variety of worker and 
job related characteristics as well as for unobserved worker heterogeneity. Such diffe-
rentials may reflect sectoral differences in the human capital endowment of the work-
force,  non-pecuniary  aspects  of  work,  rent-sharing  opportunities,  or  the  institutional 
setting (see for instance the discussion in Genre et al. 2009). Fitzenberger/Kurz (2003) 
provided an overview on earlier studies of inter-industry wage differentials in Germany. 
Recent work for Germany has paid particular attention to the temporary help sector: For 
2004, Jahn (2010) found that temporary help firm workers received only 55 percent of 
wage of workers in other industries, and that a gap of around 20 percent remained con-
trolling for observable and unobservable individual characteristics.  
Regarding selection of subsidized workers into particular industries, one might expect 
that  the  importance  of  subsidies  in  combination  with  a  “protection  period”  may  be  
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smaller in industries that are characterized by strong seasonal fluctuations of employ-
ment and where labor demand is difficult to predict. Furthermore, subsidies may be par-
ticularly well suited for industries where learning on the job enhances productivity con-
siderably or where settling-in costs are comparatively low. However, our main focus of 
interest is not on the inter-industry wage structure as such or on selection processes into 
industries, but on wage and employment outcomes of subsidized workers. In this con-
text, it is sensible to assume that as soon as a temporarily subsidized employment rela-
tionship has taken place, it may be shielded by some extent against firms’ adjustments 
in employment. Thus, workers taking up a job within industries that are subject to fre-
quent adjustments (seasonal or business-cycle related) may profit particularly from the 
“protection period” associated with subsidies. This does not rule out, however, that they 
would have fared even better, if they would have found a subsidized job within another 
industry with less employment fluctuations. 
Our study shows that results on the effectiveness of subsidies within particular indus-
tries depend on the particular question asked; in other words, findings from an intra-
industry and an inter-industry comparison do not necessarily coincide: Within most in-
dustries and in the longer run, this paper finds that – in terms of cumulated wages, em-
ployment prospects as well as tenure within the hiring firm – workers that were hired 
with the help of a subsidy fare significantly better than similar workers taking up an 
unsubsidized job. Effects on cumulated wages over our observation period of 3.5 years 
are particularly high in the construction industry and hotels and restaurants, which are 
characterized  by  strong  seasonal  adjustments  in  employment.  However,  an  inter-
industry comparison of subsidized workers shows that cumulated wages of subsidized 
workers would not have differed significantly, if they had been hired in another industry 
instead. Nonetheless, from a fiscal point of view, it seems more advantageous to grant 
subsidies for workers hired in industries that are less subject to demand fluctuations. 
In the following, Section 2 briefly describes the program and the data set, while Section 
3 depicts the econometric strategy and the variables used. Section 4 discusses within-
industry results and Section 5 inter-industry estimates. Finally, Section 6 summarizes 
and draws some conclusions.   
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2  Program features and data set 
This study jointly analyzes entries into two similar wage subsidy schemes for employers 
that were in place in Germany during the period between 1998 and 2003 (and were 
merged  during  2004).  One  type  provided  compensation  for  special  training  require-
ments (“Eingliederungszuschuss bei Einarbeitung”) and could be granted for up to 30 
percent of monthly wages for up to 6 months. The other type was aimed at hard-to-place 
unemployed with severe problems of reintegration (“Eingliederungszuschuss bei ersch-
werter Vermittlung”); it could account for as much as 50 percent of the monthly salary 
and continue for at most 12 months. Within the legal framework, caseworkers in local 
employment agencies had latitude in the allowance decision as well as in the fixing of 
the amount and duration of the subsidy. Subsidies could not be granted, if the worker 
had previously been regularly employed at the firm applying for the subsidy during the 
last four years. 
An important feature of the subsidy is the “protection period” associated with it: If the 
employer dismissed (for reasons attributable to the firm) a subsidized person within the 
subsidization period or a follow-up period of the same length, the employer could be 
asked to reimburse part of the subsidy. In line with these regulations, Hartmann (2004) 
found survey evidence that firms restrained from hiring because of flexibility require-
ments and if they could not predict labor demand in the longer run. As has already been 
noted, Hamersma (2010) showed for the US that in particular firms with a larger frac-
tion of workers exceeding the program’s job duration thresholds were likely to claim 
employment subsidies. 
When determining the size of the subsidy, only wages up to the collectively negotiated 
or the local customary level, respectively, and up to social security thresholds can be 
taken into account. Furthermore, there seems to be an informal consensus that subsidies 
should not support wage dumping and that the subsidized wages should not be below 
the local customary wage level (ZEW et al. 2006). Stephan (2010) points out that the 
high  importance  of  collective  agreements  in  Germany  implies  that  lower  or  higher 
wages for subsidized workers than for unsubsidized workers within similar jobs and 
within the same firm might first not be feasible (if the firm is covered by a collective 
agreement and the worker is unionized) and, second and even more importantly, be as- 
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sessed as not acceptable or unfair, respectively, by workers, firms’ management and 
also by caseworkers. 
Our analysis is based on an administrative data set of the German Federal Employment 
Agency, the Treatment Effects and Prediction data (TrEffeR) (Stephan et al. 2006). The 
data combine data flows on periods of registered job search, registered unemployment, 
participation in labor market programs and employment.1 Information on the characte-
ristics of the job – in particular on wages – is merged from the employment history files 
(BeH) of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). These are based on notifications 
of employment to the social security insurance and thus entail an upper bound on the 
wage information at the social security contribution limits. As we will see, however, 
subsidized employment is generally low wage employment, thus our analysis is not af-
fected by this restriction. Daily wages are computed by dividing entire earnings during 
an employment spell by the duration of the spell in days (including days without work). 
Regrettably, the data do not provide information on planned durations of subsidization, 
exact weekly working hours, whether an employer applies a collective contract, on the 
individual caseworker involved and on mean job tenure within firms. 
The sample used here covers all individuals who entered full-time employment during 
the second quarter of 2003 after a period of unemployment of up to one year. Subse-
quent wages and employment of workers are observed over a period of 3.5 years. The 
analysis restricts itself to individuals aged 25 to 49 at the beginning of their unemploy-
ment spell (younger and older persons might be eligible for specific programs for their 
age groups) and to individuals who had not had an employment spell within the same 
firm during the past three years. Excepting the first subsidized employment spell, our 
main focus is on times in unsubsidized employment that were subject to social insur-
ance contributions. Thus, when computing cumulated wage and employment outcomes, 
we exclude all marginal employment spells and spells with a daily wage rate of less 
than 10 Euro from our analysis as well as further periods of subsidized employment. If 
parallel employment spells were observed, we take into account only the spell with the 
                                                 
1   The TrEffeR data set is not available for public use, but it is composed of the same data flows as the 
Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB) of the Institute for Employment Research (Hummel et al. 
2005), for which a research data set is available.  
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highest daily wage rate. For computing job tenure, we assume that an individual is em-
ployed within the same firm as long as the firm identifier in social security notifications 
remains the same (see Brixy/Fritsch 2002 for further information on this topic). 
For all industries, the remaining data set contains around 10,000 entries in subsidized 
and 180,000 entries into unsubsidized employment. Our analysis restricts itself on those 
10 out of 61 industries where we observe at least 400 entries (or 4 percent of all entries, 
respectively) in subsidized jobs. These sectors cover around 7,000 entries in subsidized 
and 125,000 entries in unsubsidized employment. The industry classification we use is 
the WZ03 (“Wirtschaftszweigklassifikation 2003”) at the two-digit-level; as an excep-
tion, we classify temporary help firms (that are coded at the five-digit-level and belong 
to economic services) as an own industry.2 Important parts of the remaining “other eco-
nomic services” are in particular cleaning and security services.  
Table 1:  Sectoral composition of entries into employment (in percent) 
   Across sectors  Within sector  Subsidized within sector 
   Subsidized 
Unsub- 





Metal products   4.6  2.6  8.9  62.8  37.2 
Construction   19.5  23.5  4.4  61.6  38.4 
Automobile trade/repair  4.0  1.7  12.0  54.2  45.8 
Wholesale   5.8  4.1  7.4  55.5  44.5 
Retail trade  6.6  4.5  7.6  46.9  53.1 
Hotels/restaurants  4.5  6.9  3.5  41.9  58.1 
Land transportation   4.0  2.9  7.1  47.5  52.5 
Temporary help firms   6.2  12.3  2.8  28.4  71.6 
Other economic services  9.5  6.7  7.3  53.0  47.0 
Health/social services  4.5  4.3  5.5  53.7  46.3 
Other 51 industries  30.9  30.5  5.4  56.1  43.9 
Total   100.0  100.0  5.3  53.6  46.4 
 Note: Previously unemployed workers taking up a full-time job during the second quarter of 2003. 
Table 1 shows the sectoral composition of the data set in percentages, including those 
sectors not investigated further. While less than 4 percent of all entries in unsubsidized 
employment occurred in two of the selected industries (automobile trade and repair as 
                                                 
2   Some studies interpret employment in a temporary help firm itself as a treatment itself and investi-
gate the stepping stone effect of temporary help work into regular jobs (e.g. Jahn/Rosholm 2010).  
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well as land transportation), only one of the sectors excluded from our analysis covers 
around 4 percent of all entries (agriculture). As Table 1 shows, most hires by far oc-
curred within the construction sector. This is certainly driven by seasonal factors as we 
analyze entries from spring 2003. The highest share of subsidized entries is found in 
automobile trade and repair, where a subsidy was granted for more than 12 percent of 
new hires. While both types of the subsidy – for training purposes and for hard-to-place 
individuals – included in our investigation account for roughly half of all subsidized 
hires, we find some variation across sectors: In particular, within temporary help firms 
around 70 percent of subsidies were granted for hard-to-place unemployed persons. 
3  Method and variables 
Let us denote workers taking up a subsidized job during the second quarter of 2003 in a 
particular industry as the “treatment group”. The outcome variables we analyze are 1) 
nominal short-run wages (daily wages when taking up the job), 2) nominal cumulated 
wages over the entire observation period of 3.5 years (assuming wages of zero during 
times without employment), 3) cumulated days of employment over the entire observa-
tion period, and 4) job tenure in the first employment relationship during this period in 
days.  
For different industries, we are first interested in the mean difference in outcome va-
riables between the treatment group and otherwise comparable workers, who started an 
unsubsidized job during the same time period. Second, we ask for the difference in out-
comes between the treatment group and otherwise comparable workers, who started a 
subsidized employment relationship within one of the other industries under considera-
tion. We apply “matching on observables” to find adequate comparison groups (Rubin 
1974). The identifying assumption is that accounting for observable differences across 
individuals in the treatment and the comparison group – no unobserved heterogeneity 
correlated  with  the  selection  into  programs  and  with  outcome  variables  remains.  In 
other words, we assume that all variables X, determining these participation decisions as 
well as the expected success of taking up subsidized employment in a particular sector 
are known and available. Then the mean outcome in the comparison group estimates the 
mean unobserved outcome that members of the treatment group would have had, if they  
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would  not  have  been  supported  by  a  subsidy  (in  this  particular  sector).  With  non-
experimental data, regression and duration analysis might be applied, too. Matching, 
however, makes no functional form assumptions and avoids an identification of effects 
from projections into regions where there are no data points. 
Because of the high number of observable variables we have to take into account, we 
conduct a matching on the propensity score – the probability to join a program – to ob-
tain the same probability distribution for treated and non-treated individuals (Rosen-
baum and Rubin 1983). First, we estimate the individual probability to be subsidized – 
the propensity score – by a binary probit. Second, we select a comparison such that the 
distributions of the propensity scores are similar for both groups of workers. For this 
purpose,  we  conduct  a  radius  matching  (Dehejia/Wahba  2002),  which  matches  the 
treatment group with “synthetic” comparison persons, composed of a weighted equiva-
lent of all persons falling within the radius of their propensity score. The estimates were 
performed using the stata module psmatch2 (Leuven/Sianesi 2003). We choose a radius 
or caliper – the maximum distance of propensity scores between treated and comparison 
persons – of 0.002. Note that results are very stable, regardless of the particular match-
ing algorithm or caliper chosen. Finally, we compute differences of outcome variables 
between the treatment and comparison groups. We will additionally present graphs on 
shares over time for both outcome variables, because employment shares vary over time 
and the job tenure variable is right censured. 
With statistical matching, a counterfactual can be found only for those individuals in the 
treatment group who are in common support with individuals in the potential compari-
son group (see for instance Caliendo/Kopenig 2008). Common support ensures that per-
sons with the same X values – and thus the same propensity scores – have a positive 
probability of being both participants and non-participants. Individuals whose propensi-
ty scores are outside the region of common support have to be disregarded from the 
analysis. We delete all observations whose propensity score is larger than the maximum 
and smaller than the minimum in the opposite group as well as those for whom no coun-
terpart is found within the defined caliper. Of course, this implies that estimated effects 
are only consistent for the subpopulation within common support. 
For a causal interpretation of our matching results, the method requires us to observe all 
variables that are relevant a) for the assignment process into subsidized employment  
  9 
within a particular sector (compared to finding an unsubsidized job or a subsidized job 
in another industry, respectively) and b) for subsequent labor market outcomes. In fact, 
the data underlying our analysis encompass a comprehensive number of variables at the 
individual, firm and regional level that should be critical for selection as well as for out-
comes. Table 2 presents an overview on the variables underlying the estimates, which 
are mostly categorized as dummy variables. Note in particular that we account for prod-
uctivity differences between individuals by taking into account percentiles of the latest 
daily wage and cumulated wages before taking up the job under consideration (percen-
tiles are computed across the 10 industries in our final data set). Furthermore, we con-
trol in a rather detailed way for the last occupation before the unemployment spell. 
Table 2:  Variables used for the propensity score matching 
Variable group  Variables 
i)  Individual socio-
demographic  
characteristics 
Measured at the beginning of the unemployment spell: Gender, living 
in East- or West-Germany, marital status, nationality, age group, 
health problems, disability, attained degree of schooling and educa-
tion, recipient of unemployment benefits or assistance. 
ii)  Individual labor market 
history  
Participation in an active labor market program during the unemploy-
ment spell (five categories) 
Measured since the start of the unemployment spell: Duration until 
taking up the job 
Measured at the start of the unemployment spell: Days in employment 
(last three years) and days in unemployment (last two years), participa-
tion in labor market programs (last two years), sanctioned through 
caseworker (last two years) and periods of sickness (last two years) 
iii) Last occupation  Occupation in last job before unemployment (27 categories) 
iv) Firm and job characteristics  Firm size class, sectoral affiliation, mean daily wage in firm (four 
categories), blue or white collar job 
v)  Local labor market  
characteristics  Performance cluster of the regional labor market (Blien et al. 2004) 
vi) Previous wages  Percentiles of latest daily wage and previous cumulated wages during 
the last three years (ten categories each) 
 
Table A.1 in the Appendix presents mean values of the variables considered, before the 
matching took place, and we will describe shortly the most obvious differences between 
subsidized and unsubsidized workers as well as between industries: i) Beginning with 
socio-demographics,  workers  supported  by  a  subsidy  were  over-proportionally  East-
German  men,  had  better  education  and  received  unemployment  assistance.  Hires  in  
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most industries are male-dominated (exceptions are hotels and restaurants and health 
and  social  services)  and  occur  predominantly  in  West-Germany.  Human  capital  en-
dowment seems to be comparatively low for hires in hotels and restaurants as well as in 
temporary help firms. ii) Regarding the individual labor market history, those who took 
up a subsidized job had participated more often in another labor market program during 
their current as well as previous unemployment spells.3 During the years preceding their 
unemployment spell, they have spent less time in employment and more time in unem-
ployment. Comparing hires across industries, workers in the manufacturing of metal 
products as well as in automobile trade and repairs seem to be most attached to the labor 
market. iii) The last occupation individuals were working in before their unemployment 
spell mirrors to a certain extent also selection into actual industries. For instance, around 
one third of workers hired in the metal products industry had been working as a me-
chanic in his or her last job. iv) Selectivity seems to persist (beneath sectoral affiliation) 
on  the  firm’s  side.  Subsidized  employment  is  utilized  over-proportionally  by  small 
firms and low-wage firms. Furthermore, strong differences between sectors are found: 
The share of hires by large firms is highest in the temporary help sector, where also 
wages – lower than in hotels and restaurants – are rather low. Regarding job characteris-
tics, it is noteworthy that the share of unqualified blue collar workers exceeds 50 per-
cent within temporary help firms. v) Subsidized employment relationships are found 
comparatively more often in East German regions. In the period under investigation, in 
particular the construction sector hired comparatively much individuals in East German 
regions with a bad labor market situation. vi) Those taking up a subsidized job had on 
average lower earnings during the 3 years preceding their current unemployment spell. 
Across sectors, previous wages were particularly low for workers hired in health and 
social services. 
                                                 
3   In several cases, hiring subsidized as well as unsubsidized workers is directly preceded by a short-
term training measure within a firm. While information on the firm where the training took place is 
missing in the data, it is sensible to assume that it took place within the same firm. Consequently, 
the dummy variable for firm-internal training has been coded to zero, if such a training program 
took place directly within the month before taking up the job, because it can be regarded as part of 
the job already.  
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Additionally, Table A.1 provides some information on the duration and size of the sub-
sidies granted: The mean actual duration of subsidization in the 10 industries amounted 
to 4 to 5 months. We do not have individual information on the size of the subsidy, but 
information merged through cost accounting at the local level indicates that the average 
daily subsidy amounted to 17 to 20 Euros, with average costs of subsidization around 
2,400 to 3,000 Euros, depending on the particular industry. The duration of the subsidy 
was actually lowest in the temporary help sector, while the average daily subsidy rate 
was highest. 
While our approach takes into account comprehensive information about individual, job 
related and regional characteristics, several restrictions apply: First, we ignore that the 
subsidy might have been essential for the hiring decision, but we assume that differenc-
es in labor market outcomes across subsidized and unsubsidized workers are related to 
the subsidy or the “protection period” associated with the subsidy. Thus, our study un-
derestimates the effects on labor market outcomes of unemployed individuals, but esti-
mates the effect for newly hired persons. Second, although our analysis controls for a 
number of important individual and firm related features, we cannot entirely rule out 
that further (unobserved) selection processes took place. In particular, our inter-industry 
comparison assumes that subsidized workers would have been able to take up a subsi-
dized job within another industry, too. Our analysis takes this into account, however, as 
far as possible by controlling for the last occupation before entering unemployment. It is 
not adequate to control for actual occupation as this will be to some extent determined 
by the firm or industry someone is working in: In fact, the last row in Table A.1 shows 
that more than 40 percent of all individuals in our sample switched occupations when 
taking up their new job; and the share was even around 50 percent for subsidized work-
ers. Third, the analysis restricts itself to the estimation of direct effects of the subsidy on 
participating workers and does not take into account possible indirect effects on non-
participants. However, an analysis of displacement and substitution as well as effects on 
reservation wages would require a macro-analysis on the regional level. 
Finally, as an addition to the matching analysis, we conduct a simple fiscal cost-benefit-
analysis of direct program effects for subsidized workers along the lines suggested in 
Stephan (2010). This enables us to get a very rough impression of the efficiency of the 
subsidy: The computations rely on the validity of the assumptions outlined above, and  
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the analysis does not take into account possible indirect effects like substitution and 
displacement of previously unsubsidized workers through previously subsidized work-
ers. As has already been mentioned subsidy rates are not available on an individual 
base, but estimated from cost accounting at the local level. Savings in unemployment 
benefit and unemployment assistance are computed from individual daily rates received 
at the beginning of the unemployment spell. Employer and employee social security 
contributions and taxes are assumed to account for on average 50 percent of additional 
incomes (see also Pfeiffer/Winterhager 2005). 
4  Comparisons of subsidized and unsubsidized workers within industries 
Table 3 presents the main results of our comparison of workers taking up subsidized or 
unsubsidized jobs, respectively, within the same industry. Subsidized work is on aver-
age low-wage employment. The German low-wage threshold for 2003, defined as two- 
thirds of the median wage rate of all employment relationships, amounted to 59 Euro in 
West and 42 Euro per day in East Germany (Rhein/Stamm 2006). Within our data set, 
in the short-run, subsidized mean wages were – with around 38 Euros per day – lowest 
in hotels and restaurants. They were highest in the construction sector, where subsidized 
workers received daily wages of about 58 Euros. Thus, our results display well known 
inter-industry wages differentials (e.g. Genre et al. 2009). 
Before matching (rows B), the mean daily wage when taking up the job as well as cu-
mulated wages over a period of 3.5 year were found to be significantly lower for subsi-
dized workers within most industries investigated. The largest differences are shown for 
health and social services, with 14.7 Euro less per day and 13,200 Euro less over a pe-
riod of 3.5 years for subsidized workers. The only exception is the temporary help sec-
tor where mean wages of newly hired subsidized workers did not differ from those of all 
other hires. Average days in employment as well as job tenure within the first firm 
were, however, mostly higher for subsidized workers even in the unmatched sample. 
The penultimate row in Table A.1 shows the share of workers switching the industry at 
least once during the observation period: In line with longer mean job tenure, it is gen-
erally much lower across subsidized workers than across unsubsidized ones.  
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Table 3:  Mean labor market outcomes for workers taking up a subsidized (S) or 
unsubsidized (U) job within the same industry and differences (D) across 
both groups before (B) and after (A) matching 
      Daily wage when 
taking-up the job  Cumulated wages  Cumulated 
 employment 
Tenure during ob-
servation period          
    (in Euro)  (in 1000 Euro)  (in days)  (in days)  Obs.   
      S  U  D     S  U  D     S  U  D     S  U  D     S  U
#  MSB 
Metal  B  54.8  65.0  -10.2 **  54.3  60.6  -6.4 **  943  887  57 **  673  502  171 **  459  4694  12.0 
products  A  55.2  57.5  -2.3 *  54.4  50.8  3.6 *  936  838  99 **  665  476  189 **  428  4413  2.0 
Construction B  57.8  66.3  -8.5 **  48.5  53.2  -4.8 **  822  789  33 **  462  335  128 **  1962 42316  13.6 
   A  57.8  58.3  -0.4    48.5  43.7  4.8 **  822  729  93 **  463  325  138 **  1950 42187  0.8 
Automobile  B  51.4  62.1  -10.6  **  50.2  62.6  -12.4 **  916  929  -13    621  573  48    404  2987  15.5 
trade/repair  A  52.9  53.2  -0.3    53.4  50.2  3.2    949  860  89 **  638  518  120 **  343  2496  3.0 
Wholesale  B  55.5  66.0  -10.5 **  54.4  64.1  -9.7 **  920  894  25    663  537  126 **  586  7295  12.4 
   A  55.9  56.4  -0.5    55.3  51.1  4.2 **  931  833  98 **  674  488  186 **  558  6728  1.5 
Retail trade  B  47.5  54.8  -7.3 **  42.9  50.2  -7.3 **  853  851  1    607  493  115 **  665  8136  12.8 
   A  47.9  47.8  0.1    43.5  40.9  2.5    856  795  61 **  607  461  146 **  634  8038  1.5 
Hotels/  B  38.4  43.2  -4.8 **  29.8  32.3  -2.5 *  756  716  40 *  477  302  174 **  446 12443  16.9 
restaurants  A  38.6  37.7  0.9    30.1  25.2  4.9 **  762  636  125 **  481  296  184 **  421 12171  1.7 
Land trans-  B  49.6  57.7  -8.0 **  47.5  53.1  -5.6 **  921  879  42 *  599  418  181 **  400  5248  14.2 
portation  A  50.2  50.9  -0.7    48.1  45.2  2.8    923  838  85 **  598  406  192 **  374  5126  2.6 
Temporary  B  44.1  43.1  1.0    40.0  40.6  -0.6    769  757  12    380  266  114 **  627 22181  9.5 
help firms  A  44.2  42.1  2.1 **  40.1  37.1  3.0 *  770  704  65 **  381  246  135 **  621 22140  1.0 
Other ec.  B  52.4  59.4  -6.9 **  50.4  54.9  -4.5 **  891  836  55 **  590  480  109 **  951 12107  10.9 
services  A  52.7  52.3  0.4    50.8  45.9  4.9 **  892  787  105 **  587  443  144 **  917 10955  1.0 
Health/soc.  B  46.3  61.1  -14.7 **  44.6  57.8  -13.2 **  938  883  56 **  700  558  142 **  448  7668  15.5 
services  A  47.2  48.3  -1.1    45.1  43.2  2.0    931  846  85 **  687  546  141 **  413  7559  1.7 
*) Significant at a = 0.05. **) Significant at a = 0.01. 
#) Displays the unweighted number of observations after matching. 
Results after matching can be found in rows A of Table 3. The mean standardized bias 
(MSB, given in the last rows of Table 3) between the two groups of workers decreases 
considerably through matching, indicating a very good matching quality for all indus-
tries investigated. It is obvious that differences in daily wages found before matching 
were to a large extent due to differences in observed characteristics. Furthermore, we 
lose in average 6 percent of participants due to common support requirements, which 
seems acceptable.4  
                                                 
4   Table 3 displays the unweighted number of comparison group observations underlying the esti-
mates; the weighted number of comparison persons after matching is consistent with the number of 
treated persons.   
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Figure 1:  Shares in employment for workers taking up a subsidized job and 
matched unsubsidized comparison persons within the same industry as 
well as difference in shares 
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Figure 2:  Shares in first job (survivor function) for workers taking up a subsidized 
job and matched unsubsidized comparison persons within the same in-
dustry as well as difference in shares 
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After matching, wage differences decline considerably and remain significant only for 
two sectors: Subsidized workers in firms manufacturing metal products received slightly 
lower wages than similar unsubsidized workers, while the opposite was true for hires in 
temporary help firms. Cumulated wages across 3.5 years were, however, higher for sub-
sidized workers than for their unsubsidized counterparts in 6 out of 10 industries. The 
longer-term advantage of workers hired with the help of a subsidy is most obvious in 
hotels and restaurants and in other economic services, where cumulated earnings were 
about 4,900 Euros higher. Insignificant differences are found only for the metal prod-
ucts industry, automobile trade and repair as well as in health and social services.  
Furthermore, we see clearly that previously subsidized workers spent significantly more 
days in employment in the first firm than their unsubsidized counterparts. Effects on job 
tenure are much higher than effects on days in employment. Additional days in em-
ployment sum up from around 2 months (temporary help agencies) to around 4 months 
(hotels and restaurants), and mean job tenure at the first employer is longer by 4 months 
(automobile trade and repair, temporary help agencies) to more than 6 months (metal 
products, wholesale, hotels and restaurants, land transportation).  
Figures 1 and 2 provide further information on the evolvement of shares in employment 
and job tenure within the first firm (survivor function) over time. The integrals below 
shares and differences equal cumulated outcomes and their difference, respectively, in 
Table 3. Figure 1 shows that previously subsidized workers seem to be less subject to 
seasonal adjustments – even within the same industries. This is most obvious for the 
hotel and restaurant branch. Figure 2 highlights that subsidized employment relation-
ships are more stable than unsubsidized ones in particular during the first months of an 
employment relationship (see also Ruppe 2009). Differences in survivor functions peak 
between 6 to 12 months after taking up the relevant job. The aforementioned “protection 
period” might be an important reason for longer job durations of previously subsidized 
workers.  Nonetheless,  we  cannot  preclude  the  possibility  that  firms  hire  subsidized 
workers in particular in jobs that are characterized by on average longer job tenure, thus 
selection may still play a role on the firm’s side. For new employment relationships in 
Germany taken up between 1996 and 2001, Boockmann/Steffes (2010) found that more 
than 50 percent of these ended during the first two years. Among our subgroup of pre- 
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viously unemployed persons that were hired without the help of a subsidy, jobs were 
much more unstable within most industries. 
Results of the simple fiscal cost-benefit analysis are presented in Table A.2 in the Ap-
pendix. While the findings should be interpreted with care, they indicate for most indus-
tries that wage subsidies might be self-financing over the longer run: The fiscal net ef-
fect is in most cases not significantly different from zero. The highest fiscal gain of 
nearly (and significant) 1,800 Euro is found for the construction industry, where subsi-
dized workers profit from comparatively high sectoral wages. Even though cumulated 
employment effects in this industry are moderate in comparison to other sectors, they 
translate into comparatively high cumulated earnings and thus taxes and social security 
contributions. Of course, this does not imply that results for subsidized workers in other 
industries – whose characteristics differ from those of subsidized workers in construc-
tion – would have been similar, if they would have started to work in construction in-
stead. This will be shown within the next section. 
5  Comparisons for subsidized workers across industries 
In the next step, we compare individuals taking up subsidized employment within one 
industry with workers taking up a subsidized job in one of the other 9 sectors under con-
sideration. Table 4 presents the main results.  
Results before matching – and thus not accounting for observed characteristics – are 
displayed in rows B. Mirroring to a certain extent the results from Table 3, we find a 
clear ranking of wages of subsidized workers’ wages, with highest daily wages in con-
struction (around 9 Euro higher than the average across other industries) and lowest 
daily wages in hotels and restaurants (around 14 Euros lower than the average across 
other industries). This translates only partly into cumulated wages over a period of 3.5 
years as these are determined by cumulated days in employment, too: Compared to oth-
er branches, cumulated wages were up to around 8,200 Euros higher for workers in 
wholesale and up to around 18,300 Euro lower in hotels and restaurants. Furthermore, 
we find remarkable differences in cumulated days in employment, which were for in-
stance around 4 months lower for subsidized workers in hotels and restaurants or in 
temporary help firms. Mean job tenure within the first firm was comparatively low in  
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temporary help firms – workers who took up a subsidized job in other sectors stayed 
within the same firm around six more months.  
Table 4:  Mean labor market outcomes for workers taking up a subsidized job 
within a particular industry (S) or within the other 9 industries (O) and 
differences across both groups (D) before (B) and after (A) matching  
      Daily wage when 
taking-up the job  Cumulated wages  Cumulated 
 employment 
Tenure during ob-
servation period          
    (in Euro)  (in 1000 Euro)  (in days)  (in days)  Obs.   
      S  O  D     S  O  D     S  O  D     S  O  D     S  O
#)  MSB 
Metal  B  54.8  51.4  3.4 **  54.3  46.4  7.8 **  943  854  89 **  673  542  132 **  459  6489  10.1 
products  A  54.9  54.8  0.1    54.2  51.7  2.4    941  896  44 *  673  553  121 **  430  6405  1.8 
Construction B  57.8  49.2  8.6 **  48.5  46.3  2.2 **  822  875  -53 **  462  585  -123 **  1962  4986  14.4 
   A  57.6  53.3  4.3 **  48.2  50.5  -2.3    821  896  -75 **  465  570  -104 **  1836  4892  1.9 
Automobile  B  51.4  51.6  -0.2    50.2  46.7  3.5 *  916  857  59 **  621  546  75 **  404  6544  7.4 
trade/repair  A  51.5  51.7  -0.3    50.2  47.1  3.0    915  864  51 *  620  555  65 **  400  6100  1.4 
Wholesale  B  55.5  51.3  4.3 **  54.4  46.2  8.2 **  920  855  65 **  663  540  123 **  586  6362  7.2 
   A  55.3  55.2  0.1    54.1  52.4  1.7    919  894  25    664  577  88 **  576  6192  1.1 
Retail trade  B  47.5  52.1  -4.6 **  42.9  47.4  -4.5 **  853  861  -8    607  544  63 **  665  6283  8.8 
   A  47.9  48.8  -0.8    43.4  44.2  -0.8    855  856  -2    612  563  49 *  635  5930  1.4 
Hotels/  B  38.4  52.5  -14.1 **  29.8  48.1  -18.3 **  756  867  -111 **  477  555  -79 **  446  6502  17.3 
restaurants  A  39.6  38.7  0.9    30.8  32.7  -1.9    757  795  -38    487  547  -59    328  5524  3.2 
Land trans-  B  49.6  51.7  -2.1 *  47.5  46.9  0.6    921  857  65 **  599  547  52 *  400  6548  9.2 
portation  A  49.8  51.0  -1.3    47.5  45.2  2.3    920  837  84 **  604  501  104 **  390  6107  1.9 
Temporary  B  44.1  52.4  -8.2 **  40.0  47.6  -7.6 **  769  869  -100 **  380  567  -188 **  627  6321  12.0 
help firms  A  44.5  48.2  -3.7 **  40.5  44.3  -3.7    779  867  -88 **  396  590  -194 **  507  6120  3.6 
Other ec.  B  52.4  51.5  1.0    50.4  46.4  4.1 **  891  855  36 **  590  544  45 **  951  5997  9.1 
services  A  51.9  52.4  -0.4    49.6  48.6  1.1    887  864  23    581  582  -1    900  5896  1.3 
Health/soc.  B  46.3  52.0  -5.6 **  44.6  47.1  -2.5    938  855  84 **  700  540  160 **  448  6500  13.4 
services  A  46.3  46.9  -0.6    44.9  44.4  0.5    949  871  78 **  729  589  141 **  320  6024  3.2 
*) Significant at a = 0.05. **) Significant at a = 0.01.  
#) Displays the unweighted number of observations after matching. 
In a next step, we select comparison groups – comprised of otherwise similar workers in 
similar firms and regions – from the pool of individuals taking up a job in one of the 
other 9 industries. Table A.3 shows the sectoral composition of the comparison group 
chosen. As could have been expected, comparison persons for individuals working in 
services stem mostly from other service industries, while those for individuals working 
in metal products manufacturing are often working in construction, vice versa. Results 
after matching are displayed in rows A in Table 4. Again, the mean standardized bias 
(MSB) indicates a very good quality of matching. Due to common support require-
ments, on average 10 percent of participants are excluded from the estimates. The share  
  19 
of “lost observations” is highest in hotels and restaurants and in health and social ser-
vices where it reaches 20 to 30 percent. 
Controlling for observed differences in characteristics, estimated differences between 
treatment and control group mostly decrease. Most important, we find no longer any 
significant differences in cumulated wages of temporarily subsidized workers across 
industries. Cumulated wages are, however, determined by daily wages as well as by 
employment times, and here we find in fact differences across industries. First, daily 
wages in subsidized employment relationships in construction (temporary help firms) 
were around 4 Euros higher (lower) than in similar subsidized jobs within other sectors. 
Second, in particular subsidized workers within construction and temporary help firms 
spent significantly less time in employment than similar subsidized individuals taking 
up a job in another sector. The pattern is mirrored by mean duration of job tenure at the 
first employer, which is more than 6 months lower for subsidized workers within the 
temporary help sector, and around 3 months lower for workers, who took up a subsi-
dized job in construction, than for comparable subsidized workers, who found a job 
within another industry. 
Finally, Table A.4 estimates the fiscal costs and benefits of granting a subsidy in a par-
ticular industry, compared to doing so for similar workers within one of the other indus-
tries. We assume that the costs of the subsidy would have been the same, if employment 
would have been taken up in another industry. Table A.4 shows that from a fiscal point 
of view, benefits would have been significantly larger, if workers taking up subsidized 
jobs in construction and temporary help firms (which are subject to rather strong de-
mand fluctuations) would have been able to find a subsidized job within another indus-
try. The underlying reason is that – even if cumulated wages would have been the same 
in other industries – days in employment have a higher fiscal effect (through savings in 
unemployment benefits) than higher daily wages (through additional taxes and social 
security contributions). No significant net effects are found for the other industries. 
It seems rather surprising that Table A.4 displays a negative balance for construction, 
where cumulated wages of subsidized workers were comparatively high when conduct-
ing a comparison with similar unsubsidized workers (Section 4, Table A.2). Compared 
to  other  subsidized  workers,  those  in  construction  are,  however,  over-proportionally 
male East German qualified blue collar workers with comparatively high past wages.  
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While  their  subsequent  employment  shares  were  higher  than  those  of  unsubsidized 
workers within the same branch, employment shares of similar subsidized workers with-
in other industries were even higher (by around 3 months). 
6  Summary and conclusions 
For Germany, this paper estimates industry-specific effects of a wage subsidy program 
that granted time-limited supplements to firms that hired hard-to-place workers or hired 
workers into jobs with particular training requirements. First, we ask how subsequent 
wages and employment outcomes differ between similar workers, who took up a subsi-
dized or unsubsidized job, respectively, within a particular industry. Second, we com-
pare outcomes of subsidized workers across different industries. The analyzed sample 
covers workers taking up a job during the second quarter of 2003 and observes wage 
and employment outcomes over a period of 3.5 years. We use a large process generated 
data set, providing information on individual, regional and firm characteristics as well 
as on previous wages. Adequate comparison groups for subsidized workers within a 
particular industry are selected by means of statistical matching. 
As a first main result of the study, we find that subsidized workers within most sectors 
earn no significantly different wages in the short-run, realize higher cumulated earnings 
in the long-run, spend more days in employment, and stay significantly longer at their 
first employer than similar unsubsidized workers. The size of the effects differs, howev-
er, across sectors. Additional cumulated earnings range from 2,000 Euro (health and 
social services, insignificant) to 4,800 Euros (hotels and restaurants, significant). Differ-
ences in employment and tenure outcomes vary from 2 and 4 months (temporary help 
firms) to 4 and 6 months (hotels and restaurants). 
As a second main result of the study, we find that cumulated wages of initially subsi-
dized workers did not differ across industries over a longer period. We find, however, 
several  significant  inter-industry  differences  regarding  employment  and  tenure  out-
comes of temporarily subsidized workers: Job tenure is shorter by several months for 
subsidized workers taking up a job in sectors that are characterized by seasonal fluctua-
tions (construction) or uncertain demand conditions (temporary help firms).   
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A fiscal cost-benefit analysis based on the results from the latter estimates indicates that 
society may profit mostly from subsidizing jobs in sectors that are not subject to varying 
demand conditions. Considering the fact, however, that a rather high share of all hires 
out of unemployment takes place within these sectors, the potential for alternatives may 
be low. Furthermore, subsidized workers even within these industries initially fare bet-
ter than similar workers taking up an unsubsidized job. The “protection period”, encom-
passing the subsidization period and an obligatory follow-up period of the same length, 
is obviously often of sufficient length for workers to increase their productivity through 
learning-on-the-job and to reduce uncertainties about their skills. 
Finally, we would like to point out that a causal interpretation of our results relies on the 
assumption that we observe all variables that are relevant for taking part in the subsidy 
program when taking up a job as well as for subsequent labor market outcomes. In fact, 
we control for a comprehensive set of variables that should pick up much of the indi-
vidual,  job-related  and  regional  heterogeneity  across  workers.  However,  particularly 
when comparing subsidized workers across industries, it might be questionable whether 
a worker would in fact have been able to switch industries. Furthermore, our study is 
restricted to program entries during the second quarter of 2003. The effectiveness of 
subsidies  may  be  subject  to  seasonal  and  business  cycle  conditions  during  the  time 
when the relevant job was taken up. Finally, the institutional setting for several branches 
has been modified since 2003. An industry-specific minimum wage has been introduced 
in construction (König/Möller 2009). Since the end of 2003, temporary help firms have 
to pay their workers the wage paid by the client firm; alternatively, temporary help 
firms could join an industry level collective agreement (Jahn 2010). Thus, an interesting 
line for future research would be to analyze entries in subsidized work for a longer pe-
riod of calendar time in particular for those two industries. 
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Table A.1:  Dummy variable means for workers taking up a subsidized (S) or unsubsidized (U) job within the same industry before matching 
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Male, West Germany  0.35  0.62  0.28  0.59  0.39  0.64  0.38  0.60  0.32  0.41  0.15  0.35  0.38  0.63  0.52  0.55  0.31  0.45  0.15  0.24 
Female, West Germany  0.05  0.08  0.03  0.02  0.06  0.15  0.13  0.21  0.19  0.36  0.14  0.31  0.04  0.05  0.14  0.18  0.16  0.28  0.32  0.58 
Male, East Germany  0.51  0.27  0.65  0.37  0.43  0.16  0.37  0.16  0.19  0.11  0.21  0.10  0.54  0.30  0.27  0.24  0.32  0.18  0.08  0.04 
Female, East Germany  0.09  0.03  0.04  0.01  0.13  0.05  0.12  0.04  0.31  0.12  0.50  0.24  0.05  0.02  0.07  0.04  0.21  0.09  0.45  0.13 
Married  0.54  0.54  0.52  0.55  0.44  0.47  0.55  0.50  0.48  0.46  0.43  0.45  0.51  0.52  0.36  0.42  0.47  0.43  0.50  0.41 
Foreigner  0.06  0.12  0.05  0.09  0.07  0.09  0.06  0.10  0.06  0.08  0.09  0.20  0.06  0.08  0.09  0.13  0.05  0.11  0.03  0.07 
Age 25-29  0.15  0.21  0.21  0.21  0.31  0.27  0.20  0.22  0.20  0.24  0.25  0.22  0.19  0.16  0.24  0.27  0.20  0.25  0.19  0.25 
Age 30-34  0.24  0.22  0.19  0.22  0.22  0.24  0.20  0.23  0.21  0.23  0.21  0.21  0.22  0.22  0.24  0.20  0.23  0.23  0.19  0.21 
Age 35-39  0.23  0.21  0.22  0.23  0.17  0.21  0.24  0.23  0.23  0.22  0.21  0.22  0.23  0.21  0.20  0.20  0.21  0.21  0.27  0.21 
Age 40-44  0.21  0.21  0.22  0.20  0.18  0.16  0.21  0.19  0.20  0.18  0.20  0.20  0.22  0.22  0.19  0.19  0.20  0.18  0.18  0.20 
Age 45-49  0.17  0.14  0.16  0.14  0.12  0.12  0.15  0.13  0.16  0.13  0.13  0.16  0.14  0.19  0.13  0.14  0.16  0.13  0.16  0.14 
Health problems  0.06  0.05  0.03  0.03  0.05  0.05  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.05  0.07  0.04  0.08  0.06  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.06 
Severely disabled  0.03  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03 
No secondary degree  0.06  0.08  0.06  0.09  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.07  0.04  0.05  0.08  0.11  0.05  0.08  0.10  0.11  0.04  0.08  0.03  0.03 
Secondary degree (Hauptschule)  0.36  0.48  0.34  0.52  0.31  0.46  0.28  0.42  0.31  0.42  0.28  0.41  0.42  0.54  0.41  0.46  0.27  0.33  0.22  0.28 
Secondary degree (Realschule)  0.50  0.35  0.55  0.36  0.55  0.39  0.52  0.35  0.54  0.40  0.59  0.41  0.48  0.33  0.39  0.34  0.45  0.35  0.60  0.41 
Secondary degree (Gymnasium)  0.08  0.08  0.05  0.03  0.08  0.10  0.15  0.16  0.11  0.13  0.05  0.07  0.06  0.04  0.11  0.10  0.24  0.24  0.15  0.27 
No vocational training  0.15  0.23  0.13  0.18  0.13  0.15  0.16  0.21  0.14  0.18  0.20  0.31  0.20  0.26  0.26  0.30  0.14  0.22  0.12  0.14 
Vocational training  0.81  0.74  0.85  0.80  0.84  0.82  0.79  0.73  0.84  0.78  0.79  0.68  0.79  0.72  0.70  0.67  0.74  0.65  0.84  0.73 
University degree  0.04  0.03  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.03  0.05  0.06  0.03  0.04  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.04  0.03  0.12  0.13  0.04  0.13 
Unemployment benefits receipt  0.59  0.73  0.61  0.76  0.58  0.75  0.56  0.73  0.55  0.73  0.42  0.72  0.54  0.71  0.48  0.60  0.53  0.68  0.55  0.67 
Unemployment assistance receipt  0.16  0.07  0.18  0.06  0.22  0.06  0.18  0.07  0.23  0.07  0.34  0.09  0.24  0.07  0.25  0.11  0.22  0.09  0.19  0.07 
No benefit receipt  0.25  0.20  0.21  0.17  0.20  0.20  0.25  0.20  0.22  0.20  0.24  0.20  0.23  0.22  0.27  0.29  0.25  0.23  0.25  0.26 
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#.: Wage subsidy  0.02  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.00 
During current UE.: Further vocational training  0.07  0.02  0.03  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.03  0.01  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.01  0.04  0.02  0.04  0.01  0.02  0.01 
During current UE.: Short training within firm  0.06  0.09  0.05  0.04  0.05  0.09  0.05  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.02  0.06  0.07  0.05  0.03  0.05  0.07  0.04  0.04 
During current UE: Short classroom training  0.16  0.08  0.11  0.04  0.13  0.07  0.15  0.08  0.15  0.07  0.15  0.05  0.09  0.05  0.13  0.08  0.13  0.08  0.15  0.06 
During current UE.: Other program  0.02  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.03  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01 
Job entry during month 1 of UE  0.08  0.10  0.06  0.05  0.06  0.13  0.06  0.11  0.07  0.11  0.06  0.08  0.06  0.10  0.06  0.12  0.07  0.11  0.08  0.19 
Job entry during month 2-3 of UE  0.17  0.24  0.14  0.15  0.19  0.26  0.15  0.22  0.14  0.23  0.14  0.17  0.14  0.21  0.13  0.24  0.16  0.23  0.21  0.31 
Job entry during month 4-6 of UE  0.32  0.40  0.38  0.59  0.29  0.33  0.32  0.37  0.31  0.36  0.27  0.41  0.29  0.45  0.27  0.33  0.31  0.35  0.25  0.26 
Job entry during month 7-9 of UE  0.23  0.18  0.25  0.16  0.26  0.18  0.25  0.18  0.22  0.19  0.28  0.27  0.32  0.16  0.27  0.20  0.23  0.19  0.27  0.14 
Job entry during month 10-12 of UE  0.20  0.08  0.17  0.05  0.20  0.10  0.23  0.11  0.26  0.11  0.24  0.07  0.19  0.08  0.28  0.12  0.23  0.12  0.19  0.09 
3 years before UE: Employed up to 1 month  0.12  0.04  0.07  0.02  0.12  0.05  0.10  0.05  0.15  0.06  0.18  0.05  0.11  0.03  0.14  0.07  0.15  0.08  0.25  0.14 
3 years before UE: Employed 1-6 months  0.07  0.04  0.05  0.02  0.07  0.04  0.07  0.04  0.09  0.04  0.13  0.04  0.08  0.03  0.13  0.06  0.09  0.05  0.07  0.05 
3 years before UE: Employed 7-12 months  0.08  0.05  0.10  0.05  0.14  0.05  0.11  0.07  0.09  0.07  0.17  0.09  0.11  0.07  0.14  0.10  0.13  0.08  0.11  0.08 
3 years before UE: Employed 13-18 months  0.15  0.11  0.18  0.10  0.14  0.09  0.13  0.11  0.18  0.11  0.19  0.16  0.17  0.12  0.22  0.15  0.16  0.13  0.16  0.11 
3 years before UE: Employed 19-24 months  0.12  0.14  0.19  0.21  0.15  0.14  0.14  0.14  0.15  0.15  0.11  0.26  0.17  0.18  0.14  0.17  0.12  0.15  0.09  0.12 
3 years before UE: Employed 25-30 months  0.22  0.24  0.24  0.33  0.19  0.24  0.25  0.24  0.17  0.24  0.15  0.22  0.20  0.28  0.17  0.22  0.20  0.23  0.19  0.18 
3 years before UE: Employed 30-36 months  0.25  0.38  0.18  0.26  0.19  0.39  0.19  0.36  0.16  0.34  0.07  0.19  0.18  0.29  0.06  0.22  0.15  0.28  0.14  0.32 
2 years before UE: Unemployed up to 1 month  0.52  0.58  0.35  0.35  0.41  0.64  0.47  0.60  0.44  0.59  0.33  0.36  0.37  0.47  0.32  0.45  0.44  0.57  0.51  0.66 
2 years before UE: Unemployed 1-6 months  0.17  0.22  0.24  0.31  0.19  0.20  0.21  0.21  0.15  0.20  0.18  0.25  0.19  0.26  0.22  0.26  0.17  0.20  0.16  0.18 
2 years before UE: Unemployed 7-12 months  0.15  0.14  0.24  0.26  0.19  0.11  0.16  0.13  0.19  0.14  0.21  0.28  0.21  0.21  0.20  0.18  0.19  0.15  0.16  0.10 
2 years before UE: Unemployed 13-18 months  0.11  0.05  0.11  0.05  0.13  0.04  0.11  0.05  0.12  0.05  0.14  0.09  0.15  0.05  0.16  0.08  0.14  0.06  0.09  0.04 
2 years before UE: Unemployed 19-24 months  0.04  0.02  0.06  0.01  0.08  0.01  0.06  0.02  0.10  0.02  0.14  0.02  0.09  0.02  0.10  0.03  0.06  0.03  0.07  0.02 
2 years before UE: Participation in program  0.36  0.17  0.34  0.13  0.41  0.15  0.33  0.16  0.39  0.16  0.45  0.17  0.39  0.17  0.46  0.25  0.40  0.20  0.44  0.22 
2 years before UE: Periods of sickness  0.10  0.06  0.12  0.08  0.12  0.04  0.10  0.05  0.11  0.05  0.17  0.09  0.15  0.08  0.14  0.08  0.13  0.06  0.12  0.05 
2 years before UE: Sanctioned  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.01 
#) UE = unemployment spell before taking up a job during the second quarter of 2003.    
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Agricultural worker  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.01 
Miner/stone/ceramics worker  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Chemistry worker  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00 
Paper/wood worker  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00 
Metal trade worker  0.11  0.12  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.06  0.05  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00 
Mechanic  0.32  0.35  0.11  0.08  0.32  0.31  0.07  0.07  0.08  0.06  0.02  0.01  0.07  0.04  0.13  0.17  0.05  0.05  0.04  0.02 
Electrician  0.04  0.02  0.04  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.07  0.07  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.01 
Assembly worker  0.03  0.05  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.04  0.04  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Textile/leather worker  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00 
Food industry worker  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.04  0.25  0.31  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.03 
Construction worker  0.07  0.08  0.41  0.45  0.05  0.03  0.08  0.06  0.06  0.03  0.02  0.01  0.12  0.06  0.08  0.06  0.10  0.07  0.02  0.01 
Fitting worker  0.03  0.02  0.10  0.10  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.00  0.00 
Carpenter  0.03  0.03  0.05  0.03  0.02  0.01  0.05  0.02  0.04  0.03  0.01  0.00  0.05  0.01  0.03  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01 
Painter  0.03  0.02  0.06  0.13  0.04  0.05  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.05  0.07  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.01 
Shipment worker  0.02  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.04  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01 
Unskilled worker  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Machine operator  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.04  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.04  0.04  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00 
Engineers  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.08  0.06  0.01  0.01 
Technican  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.03  0.01  0.00 
Sales worker  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.04  0.02  0.00  0.00 
Service worker  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.01  0.15  0.17  0.12  0.16  0.28  0.35  0.11  0.08  0.04  0.04  0.06  0.05  0.09  0.08  0.06  0.04 
Transportation worker  0.07  0.06  0.04  0.03  0.09  0.09  0.16  0.21  0.06  0.09  0.03  0.03  0.44  0.63  0.12  0.12  0.07  0.07  0.03  0.02 
Clerical worker  0.08  0.06  0.05  0.03  0.13  0.15  0.20  0.19  0.17  0.12  0.09  0.05  0.04  0.05  0.12  0.10  0.22  0.21  0.14  0.09 
Security services worker  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.05  0.07  0.00  0.01 
Health/social/education worker  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.48  0.66 
General services worker  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.32  0.41  0.01  0.01  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.09  0.06  0.05 
Other worker  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.01 
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  Firm size < 10  0.33  0.28  0.52  0.49  0.50  0.42  0.41  0.27  0.62  0.48  0.68  0.55  0.51  0.42  0.06  0.03  0.51  0.32  0.44  0.26 
Firm size 10-24  0.25  0.24  0.28  0.29  0.31  0.26  0.25  0.23  0.19  0.21  0.17  0.24  0.26  0.29  0.15  0.09  0.20  0.19  0.21  0.15 
Firm size 25-74  0.27  0.23  0.14  0.16  0.15  0.20  0.22  0.26  0.14  0.15  0.13  0.16  0.16  0.19  0.40  0.40  0.17  0.19  0.20  0.24 
Firm size >= 75  0.14  0.25  0.05  0.07  0.04  0.12  0.12  0.24  0.05  0.16  0.02  0.06  0.08  0.10  0.38  0.49  0.11  0.30  0.14  0.36 
Mean daily wage in firm: Percentile 1-25  0.13  0.10  0.19  0.17  0.26  0.19  0.20  0.09  0.41  0.28  0.74  0.55  0.25  0.17  0.34  0.35  0.39  0.27  0.29  0.14 
Mean daily wage in firm: Percentile 26-50  0.31  0.15  0.28  0.18  0.37  0.18  0.22  0.12  0.25  0.24  0.22  0.29  0.35  0.23  0.48  0.45  0.24  0.22  0.33  0.23 
Mean daily wage in firm: Percentile 51-75  0.34  0.27  0.35  0.31  0.23  0.28  0.29  0.25  0.25  0.28  0.03  0.13  0.28  0.32  0.15  0.17  0.18  0.20  0.24  0.32 
Mean daily wage in firm: Percentile 76-100  0.23  0.48  0.19  0.34  0.14  0.35  0.29  0.54  0.09  0.20  0.01  0.03  0.13  0.28  0.03  0.03  0.19  0.31  0.14  0.31 
Unqualified blue collar worker  0.34  0.39  0.24  0.26  0.19  0.25  0.29  0.37  0.20  0.22  0.37  0.48  0.38  0.50  0.51  0.54  0.27  0.38  0.13  0.15 
Qualified blue collar worker  0.55  0.50  0.66  0.69  0.52  0.42  0.34  0.21  0.28  0.22  0.48  0.42  0.53  0.44  0.31  0.33  0.21  0.16  0.14  0.07 






































  East Germany, worst situation  0.07  0.04  0.11  0.06  0.11  0.03  0.08  0.03  0.08  0.03  0.13  0.04  0.13  0.04  0.06  0.04  0.07  0.03  0.07  0.02 
East Germany, bad situation  0.39  0.21  0.48  0.26  0.35  0.13  0.34  0.13  0.31  0.15  0.44  0.25  0.37  0.21  0.21  0.18  0.36  0.18  0.37  0.11 
East Germany, high unemployment  0.13  0.05  0.10  0.07  0.08  0.04  0.06  0.04  0.10  0.04  0.12  0.04  0.08  0.06  0.06  0.05  0.08  0.04  0.07  0.03 
Urban area, high unemployment  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.03  0.07  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.07  0.04  0.06  0.07  0.06  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.10  0.07  0.10 
Urban area, medium unemployment  0.06  0.10  0.04  0.05  0.08  0.12  0.11  0.13  0.08  0.11  0.04  0.06  0.05  0.08  0.20  0.14  0.09  0.13  0.08  0.13 
Above average unemp., moderate dynamics  0.05  0.06  0.04  0.07  0.08  0.07  0.06  0.06  0.08  0.09  0.05  0.13  0.05  0.06  0.05  0.05  0.06  0.05  0.09  0.10 
Rural area, average unemployment  0.03  0.06  0.04  0.06  0.06  0.07  0.05  0.06  0.05  0.07  0.03  0.05  0.07  0.07  0.06  0.05  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.07 
Rural area, below average unemployment  0.12  0.17  0.08  0.12  0.09  0.18  0.13  0.17  0.11  0.14  0.05  0.10  0.09  0.14  0.14  0.13  0.10  0.12  0.09  0.15 
Center, good situation and high dynamics  0.01  0.04  0.01  0.04  0.03  0.08  0.03  0.11  0.05  0.09  0.01  0.07  0.03  0.06  0.04  0.10  0.04  0.12  0.03  0.09 
Rural area, good situation and high dynamics  0.02  0.04  0.01  0.09  0.01  0.04  0.01  0.04  0.02  0.04  0.01  0.05  0.03  0.05  0.02  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.03 
Small-business dominated, good situation  0.05  0.12  0.02  0.06  0.05  0.11  0.05  0.12  0.03  0.10  0.03  0.09  0.02  0.10  0.05  0.11  0.04  0.10  0.03  0.10 
Very good situation  0.04  0.07  0.02  0.07  0.03  0.06  0.04  0.06  0.04  0.06  0.03  0.08  0.02  0.07  0.03  0.05  0.04  0.05  0.03  0.06 
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Table A.1 continued 
 
 
   Metal  Construction  Automobile  Wholesale  Retail trade  Hotels/   Land  Temporary  Other ec.  Health/soc. 
    products      trade/repair          restaurants  transportation  help firms  services  services 
 
 




















Latest daily Wage: Percentile 0-10  0.14  0.07  0.09  0.04  0.15  0.10  0.15  0.09  0.22  0.12  0.29  0.14  0.13  0.07  0.19  0.12  0.20  0.14  0.33  0.20 
Latest daily Wage: Percentile 11-20  0.08  0.05  0.06  0.03  0.12  0.07  0.10  0.06  0.17  0.13  0.26  0.26  0.10  0.06  0.15  0.14  0.13  0.12  0.14  0.12 
Latest daily Wage: Percentile 21-30  0.10  0.08  0.10  0.05  0.14  0.08  0.10  0.08  0.14  0.11  0.18  0.20  0.14  0.10  0.13  0.14  0.14  0.11  0.14  0.09 
Latest daily Wage: Percentile 31-40  0.15  0.10  0.16  0.09  0.11  0.08  0.12  0.08  0.07  0.10  0.10  0.11  0.16  0.11  0.13  0.12  0.10  0.09  0.09  0.08 
Latest daily Wage: Percentile 41-50  0.10  0.10  0.15  0.12  0.12  0.09  0.08  0.08  0.07  0.08  0.07  0.08  0.11  0.10  0.09  0.10  0.09  0.08  0.05  0.07 
Latest daily Wage: Percentile 51-60  0.08  0.11  0.13  0.11  0.12  0.11  0.12  0.10  0.07  0.09  0.03  0.06  0.11  0.13  0.09  0.10  0.07  0.08  0.08  0.08 
Latest daily Wage: Percentile 61-70  0.12  0.12  0.10  0.12  0.07  0.13  0.10  0.12  0.07  0.10  0.04  0.06  0.09  0.14  0.09  0.08  0.06  0.08  0.05  0.08 
Latest daily Wage: Percentile 71-80  0.08  0.12  0.08  0.15  0.05  0.11  0.07  0.10  0.08  0.09  0.02  0.03  0.07  0.12  0.07  0.07  0.06  0.07  0.04  0.08 
Latest daily Wage: Percentile 81-90  0.07  0.12  0.07  0.16  0.06  0.11  0.08  0.10  0.05  0.07  0.01  0.03  0.06  0.09  0.03  0.06  0.05  0.08  0.03  0.08 
Latest daily Wage: Percentile 91-100  0.09  0.13  0.07  0.12  0.06  0.13  0.09  0.18  0.05  0.10  0.01  0.03  0.05  0.08  0.04  0.06  0.09  0.15  0.04  0.11 
Previous cumulated wages: Percentile 0-10  0.17  0.07  0.11  0.04  0.20  0.09  0.18  0.09  0.25  0.11  0.36  0.11  0.17  0.06  0.26  0.14  0.25  0.14  0.34  0.20 
Previous cumulated wages: Percentile 11-20  0.13  0.07  0.11  0.05  0.16  0.07  0.12  0.09  0.15  0.11  0.22  0.19  0.14  0.08  0.19  0.14  0.17  0.11  0.19  0.11 
Previous cumulated wages: Percentile 21-30  0.10  0.07  0.11  0.06  0.11  0.07  0.10  0.07  0.14  0.11  0.19  0.21  0.13  0.09  0.15  0.12  0.10  0.10  0.11  0.10 
Previous cumulated wages: Percentile 31-40  0.08  0.08  0.12  0.08  0.09  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.11  0.10  0.08  0.16  0.12  0.09  0.10  0.12  0.09  0.10  0.08  0.11 
Previous cumulated wages: Percentile 41-50  0.08  0.09  0.14  0.11  0.10  0.10  0.09  0.08  0.09  0.09  0.05  0.11  0.12  0.11  0.07  0.11  0.09  0.09  0.07  0.08 
Previous cumulated wages: Percentile 51-60  0.10  0.10  0.12  0.12  0.11  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.07  0.09  0.03  0.08  0.09  0.12  0.07  0.10  0.08  0.08  0.06  0.07 
Previous cumulated wages: Percentile 61-70  0.10  0.11  0.09  0.14  0.07  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.06  0.09  0.04  0.06  0.08  0.12  0.06  0.08  0.08  0.07  0.04  0.07 
Previous cumulated wages: Percentile 71-80  0.06  0.11  0.08  0.15  0.07  0.10  0.09  0.10  0.06  0.09  0.02  0.04  0.05  0.13  0.05  0.07  0.04  0.08  0.04  0.08 
Previous cumulated wages: Percentile 81-90  0.08  0.13  0.07  0.14  0.04  0.14  0.09  0.12  0.04  0.10  0.01  0.03  0.07  0.12  0.04  0.06  0.04  0.08  0.04  0.08 























  Average duration of subsidy (in days)  134  -  135  -  154  -  142  -  154  -  162  -  155  -  125  -  151  -  157  - 
Average daily subsidy rate (in Euro)  17.5  -  17.3  -  17.8  -  18.1  -  18.4  -  18.3  -  18.5  -  19.6  -  18.3  -  17.9  - 
Average costs of subsidy (in Euro)  2438  -  2438  -  2826  -  2626  -  2903  -  3050  -  2925  -  2456  -  2825  -  2934  - 
Daily unemployment benefits (in Euro)  18.6  22.0  19.6  23.4  18.1  21.0  18.1  22.0  16.5  18.6  13.5  15.9  17.9  20.4  16.0  16.4  17.3  19.3  15.3  17.2 
Number of observations  459  4694  1962  42316  404  2987  586  7295  665  8136  446  12443  400  5248  627  22181  951  12107  448  7668 
Hired persons per firm  1.9  3.7  2.1  2.9  1.2  1.6  2.1  2.2  1.4  2.0  1.6  2.3  2.0  2.1  7.9  11.3  2.0  4.5  1.4  1.9 
At least one other industry within 3.5 years  0.09  0.25  0.06  0.13  0.07  0.18  0.08  0.26  0.08  0.20  0.06  0.14  0.10  0.25  0.14  0.30  0.06  0.22  0.03  0.10 
Hiring occupation not equal latest occupation  0.65  0.53  0.40  0.28  0.54  0.46  0.63  0.54  0.53  0.45  0.54  0.39  0.54  0.34  0.63  0.61  0.58  0.55  0.40  0.27  
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Table A.2:  Fiscal cost-benefit analysis of direct within industry program effects for the 3.5 year period since taking up the job (mean values in Euro) 
   Metal  Constr.  Autom.  Whole-  Retail trade  Hotels/   Land  Temporary  Other ec.  Health/soc. 
   products     trade/repair  sale     restaurants  transp.  help firms  services  services 
Daily unemployment benefit/assistance (in Euro)  19  20  18  18  17  14  18  16  17  15 
Additional days in employment  99  93  89  98  61  125  85  65  105  85 
A) Savings in unemployment benefits/assistance  1834  1832  1609  1783  1004  1688  1523  1045  1817  1299 
Additional earnings over 3.5 years (in Euro)  3599  4793  3241  4177  2544  4927  2848  2999  4948  1961 
B) Additional social sec. contributions/taxes  1800  2396  1620  2088  1272  2464  1424  1499  2474  980 
Duration of the subsidy (in days)  134  135  154  142  154  162  155  125  151  157 
Daily rate of subsidization (in Euro)  17  17  18  18  18  18  18  20  18  18 
C) Amount of the subsidy (in Euro)  2438  2438  2826  2626  2903  3050  2925  2456  2825  2934 
A + B – C = Fiscal net effect (in Euro)  1195  1791  403  1246  -626  1101  21  88  1466  -655 
Note: The analysis is based on estimation results from Table 3 and on means from Table A.1. For A), B), and A+B-C, bold types indicate significance at α = 0.05.  
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Table A.3:  Sectoral composition of the comparison group in Table 4 (shares) 
   Treatment group 
Composition  Metal  Construction  Automobile  Wholesale  Retail trade  Hotels/   Land  Temporary  Other ec.  Health/soc. 
comparison group  products     trade/repair        restaurants  transportation  help firms  services  services 
Metal products   -  0.14  0.10  0.08  0.05  0.02  0.07  0.12  0.07  0.05 
Construction   0.35  -  0.29  0.26  0.20  0.10  0.31  0.14  0.25  0.12 
Automobile trade  0.09  0.11  -  0.07  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.05  0.06  0.06 
Wholesale   0.12  0.15  0.11  -  0.12  0.08  0.14  0.09  0.14  0.09 
Retail trade   0.07  0.13  0.12  0.12  -  0.24  0.09  0.09  0.14  0.21 
Hotels & restaurants  0.02  0.03  0.05  0.04  0.10  -  0.04  0.07  0.08  0.10 
Land transportation   0.06  0.12  0.07  0.09  0.06  0.05  -  0.07  0.06  0.05 
Temporay help firms   0.15  0.07  0.09  0.09  0.08  0.10  0.10  -  0.12  0.11 
Other economic services  0.11  0.23  0.14  0.19  0.21  0.19  0.14  0.29  -  0.22 
Health & social services  0.04  0.02  0.04  0.06  0.11  0.13  0.03  0.07  0.08  -  
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Table A.4:  Fiscal cost-benefit analysis of subsidization within one particular sector compared to subsidization within one of the other 9 industries 
for the 3.5 year period since taking up the job (mean values in Euro) 
   Metal  Constr.  Autom.  Whole-  Retail trade  Hotels/   Land  Temporary  Other ec.  Health/soc. 
   products     trade/repair  Sale     restaurants  transp.  help firms  services  services 
Daily unemployment benefit/assistance (in Euro)  19  20  18  18  17  14  18  16  17  15 
Additional days in employment  44  -75  51  25  -2  -38  84  -88  23  78 
A) Savings in unemployment benefits/assistance  820  -1473  921  453  -31  -516  1495  -1405  405  1186 
Additional earnings over 3.5 years (in Euro)  2449  -2305  3037  1706  -801  -1914  2287  -3732  1058  498 
B) Additional social sec. contributions/taxes  1225  -1152  1519  853  -400  -957  1143  -1866  529  249 
A + B = Fiscal net effect (in Euro)  2045  -2625  2439  1305  -431  -1473  2638  -3271  935  1435 
Note: The analysis is based on estimation results from Table 4 and on means from Table A.1. For A), B) and A+B, bold types indicate significance at α = 0.05. 